Query Details

IO Cs For Smart Ape SG Fake Browser Update Leads To Net Support RAT And Steal C

Query

let URL_IOCs =DeviceNetworkEvents 
| extend method = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).method), uri = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).uri)
| where (method has "POST" and ("RemoteIP" startswith "62.164.130" or uri endswith "dll")) or RemoteUrl contains "cinaweine" or RemoteIP startswith "194.180.191" or RemoteUrl contains "poormet";
let FILE_IOC = DeviceFileEvents | where SHA256 has "47f59d61beabd8f1dcbbdd190483271c7f596a277ecbe9fd227238a7ff74cbfc" or SHA256 has "b71f07964071f20aaeb5575d7273e2941853973defa6cb22160e126484d4a5d3" or SHA256 contains "e9eb934dad3f87ee581df72af265183f86fdfad87018eed358fb4d7f669e5b7d" or FileName has "rtworkq.dll" or FileName has "misk.zip" or (FileName startswith "update " and FileName endswith "js") ;
let DLL_IOC = DeviceImageLoadEvents | where SHA256 has "021bb478b704abb95ac2040061b7d47d8e4b491e6d2633adb010c3b8b08bb4f4";
union URL_IOCs, FILE_IOC, DLL_IOC

About this query

MITRE ATT&CK Technique(s)

Technique IDTitle
T1189Drive-by Compromise

Author: Sergio Albea (19/02/2025)


IOCs for SmartApeSG fake browser update leads to NetSupport RAT and StealC

Based on the post below posted by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, I created a quick KQL query to detect potential matches with some of the IOCs related to distribution of hashtag#NetSupportRAT and hashtag#StealC malware. In some parts of the query, I use broader conditions instead of specifying exact DLL names or remote IP addresses. This approach helps extend detection capabilities in case the threat actor modifies file names or switches to a similar IP.

Explanation

This KQL query is designed to detect potential indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with a fake browser update campaign that leads to the installation of NetSupport RAT and StealC malware. Here's a simplified breakdown of what the query does:

  1. URL IOCs Detection:

    • It examines network events to identify suspicious activity.
    • It looks for HTTP POST requests where the remote IP starts with "62.164.130" or the URI ends with "dll".
    • It also checks if the remote URL contains specific strings like "cinaweine" or "poormet", or if the remote IP starts with "194.180.191".
  2. File IOCs Detection:

    • It scans file events for specific file hashes (SHA256) that are known to be associated with the malware.
    • It also looks for files with specific names or patterns, such as "rtworkq.dll", "misk.zip", or files that start with "update " and end with "js".
  3. DLL IOCs Detection:

    • It checks for DLL files being loaded with a specific SHA256 hash that is linked to the malware.
  4. Combining Results:

    • The query combines the results from the URL, file, and DLL checks to provide a comprehensive detection of potential threats.

Overall, this query is designed to identify suspicious activities and files that may indicate the presence of the NetSupport RAT and StealC malware, using both specific and broader conditions to enhance detection capabilities.

Details

Sergio Albea profile picture

Sergio Albea

Released: July 21, 2026

Tables

DeviceNetworkEventsDeviceFileEventsDeviceImageLoadEvents

Keywords

DeviceNetworkEventsFileImageLoad

Operators

letextendtostring()parse_json()wherehasstartswithendswithcontainsunion

MITRE Techniques

Actions

GitHub