Multiple Email Entity AAD Non Interactive User Sign In Logs
Query
// This query assumes a feed of threat indicators is ingested/synchronized periodically, and each synchronization ingests new indicators and only old indicators that have been modified.
// Active threat indicators in Sentinel are renovated as ThreatIntelligenceIndicator events every ~12 days.
let query_frequency = 1h;
let query_period = 14d;
let query_wait = 0h;
let table_query_lookback = 14d;
let _TIBenignProperty =
_GetWatchlist('ID-TIBenignProperty')
| where Notes has_any ("[SourceEmailAddress]")
| project IndicatorId, BenignProperty
;
let _TIExcludedSources = toscalar(
_GetWatchlist('Activity-ExpectedSignificantActivity')
| where Activity == "ThreatIndicatorSource"
| summarize make_list(Auxiliar)
);
let _UncompromisedFailureResultTypes = toscalar(
_GetWatchlist('ResultType-SignInLogsErrorCodes')
| where isnotempty(ResultDescription) and not(Notes has_any ("[Success]", "[Expired]"))
| summarize make_list(ResultType)
);
let _TITableMatch = (table_start: datetime, table_end: datetime, only_new_ti: boolean, ti_start: datetime = datetime(null)) {
// Scheduled Analytics rules have a query period limit of 14d
let _Indicators =// materialize(
ThreatIntelligenceIndicator
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
// Take the earliest TimeGenerated and the latest column info
| summarize hint.strategy=shuffle
minTimeGenerated = min(TimeGenerated),
arg_max(TimeGenerated, Active, Description, ActivityGroupNames, IndicatorId, ThreatType, DomainName, Url, ExpirationDateTime, ConfidenceScore, AdditionalInformation, ExternalIndicatorId, EmailSenderAddress)
by IndicatorId
// Remove inactive or expired indicators
| where not(not(Active) or ExpirationDateTime < now())
// Pick indicators that contain the desired entity type
| where isnotempty(EmailSenderAddress)
| extend EmailAddress = tolower(EmailSenderAddress)
// Remove indicators from specific sources
| where not(AdditionalInformation has_any (_TIExcludedSources) or Description has_any (_TIExcludedSources))
// Remove excluded indicators with benign properties
| join kind=leftanti _TIBenignProperty on IndicatorId, $left.EmailAddress == $right.BenignProperty
// Deduplicate indicators by EmailAddress column, equivalent to using join kind=innerunique afterwards
| summarize hint.strategy=shuffle
minTimeGenerated = min(minTimeGenerated),
take_any(*)
by EmailAddress
// If we want only new indicators, remove indicators received previously
| where not(only_new_ti and minTimeGenerated < ti_start)
//)
;
//let _IndicatorsLength = toscalar(_Indicators | summarize count());
//let _IndicatorsPrefilter = toscalar(
// _Indicators
// | extend AuxiliarField = tostring(split(EmailAddress, ".")[-1])
// | summarize make_set_if(AuxiliarField, isnotempty(AuxiliarField))
//);
//let _IndicatorsPrefilterLength = array_length(_IndicatorsPrefilter);
let _TableEvents =
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (table_start .. table_end)
// Filter events that may contain indicators
//| where not(_IndicatorsPrefilterLength < 10000 and not(UserPrincipalName has_any (_IndicatorsPrefilter))) // valid TLD ~1500 , "has_any" limit 10000
| extend EmailAddress = tolower(UserPrincipalName)
//| where not(_IndicatorsLength < 1000000 and not(EmailAddress in (toscalar(_Indicators | summarize make_list(EmailAddress))))) // "in" limit 1.000.000
| project-rename AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs_TimeGenerated = TimeGenerated
;
_Indicators
| join kind=inner hint.strategy=shuffle _TableEvents on EmailAddress
// Take only a single event by key columns
//| summarize hint.strategy=shuffle take_any(*) by EmailAddress, UserId
| project
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs_TimeGenerated,
Description, ActivityGroupNames, IndicatorId, ThreatType, DomainName, Url, ExpirationDateTime, ConfidenceScore, AdditionalInformation, EmailSenderAddress,
Category, UserPrincipalName, UserDisplayName, IPAddress, Location, ResultType, ResultDescription, ClientAppUsed, AppDisplayName, ResourceDisplayName, DeviceDetail, UserAgent, AuthenticationDetails, ConditionalAccessPolicies, RiskState, RiskEventTypes, RiskLevelDuringSignIn, RiskLevelAggregated, UserId, OriginalRequestId, CorrelationId
};
union// isfuzzy=true
// Match current table events all indicators available
_TITableMatch(ago(query_frequency + query_wait), ago(query_wait), false),
// Match past table events new indicators since last query execution
_TITableMatch(ago(table_query_lookback + query_wait), ago(query_frequency + query_wait), true, ago(query_frequency))
| summarize arg_max(AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs_TimeGenerated, *) by IndicatorId, UserId
| extend
timestamp = AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs_TimeGenerated,
IPCustomEntity = IPAddress,
AccountCustomEntity = EmailSenderAddressExplanation
This KQL query is designed to identify and analyze suspicious activities related to threat indicators, specifically focusing on email addresses. Here's a simplified breakdown of what the query does:
-
Setup and Definitions:
- It defines several parameters like
query_frequency,query_period, andquery_waitto control the timing and scope of the query. - It retrieves lists of benign properties and excluded sources from watchlists to filter out non-threatening indicators.
- It defines several parameters like
-
Threat Indicator Processing:
- It fetches threat indicators from the
ThreatIntelligenceIndicatortable that have been updated or are new within the last 14 days. - It filters out inactive or expired indicators and those from excluded sources.
- It focuses on indicators that have an associated email address and removes any that match benign properties.
- It fetches threat indicators from the
-
Event Matching:
- It retrieves logs of non-interactive user sign-ins from Azure Active Directory (
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs) within a specified time range. - It matches these logs against the filtered threat indicators based on email addresses.
- It retrieves logs of non-interactive user sign-ins from Azure Active Directory (
-
Union of Results:
- It combines results from two scenarios:
- Current events matched with all available indicators.
- Past events matched with new indicators since the last query execution.
- It combines results from two scenarios:
-
Final Output:
- It summarizes the results to show the most recent event for each unique combination of threat indicator and user.
- It extends the output with additional information like timestamps, IP addresses, and email addresses for further analysis.
In essence, this query is designed to detect and analyze potential threats by correlating threat intelligence indicators with user sign-in activities, focusing on email-based threats.
Details

Jose Sebastián Canós
Released: December 13, 2023
Tables
ThreatIntelligenceIndicatorAADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
Keywords
ThreatIntelligenceIndicatorAADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogsUserPrincipalNameEmailSenderAddressUserIdIPAddressDeviceDetailUserAgentAuthenticationDetailsConditionalAccessPoliciesRiskStateRiskEventTypesRiskLevelDuringSignInRiskLevelAggregatedOriginalRequestIdCorrelationId
Operators
lethas_anyprojecttoscalarwhereisnotemptyandnotsummarizemake_listarg_maxextendtolowerjoinkindleftantiproject-renamebetweenunion