Multiple Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Rule
Query
// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy
let query_frequency = 5m;
let query_period = 2d;
AADUserRiskEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
| where Source == "MicrosoftCloudAppSecurity" and RiskEventType == "mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules"
| summarize FirstTimeGenerated = min(TimeGenerated), arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by Id
| where FirstTimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
| mv-apply Auxiliar = AdditionalInfo on (
summarize AdditionalInfoBag = make_bag(bag_pack(tostring(Auxiliar["Key"]), Auxiliar["Value"]))
)
| extend VendorOriginalId = tostring(split(tostring(AdditionalInfoBag["alertUrl"]), "/")[-1])
| project
//TimeGenerated,
ActivityDateTime,
DetectedDateTime,
Source,
Activity,
DetectionTimingType,
UserDisplayName,
UserPrincipalName,
UserId,
IpAddress,
RequestId,
CorrelationId,
TokenIssuerType,
RiskEventType,
RiskDetail,
RiskLevel,
RiskState,
AdditionalInfo,
Id,
VendorOriginalId
| extend AltAlertLink = strcat("https://entra.microsoft.com/#blade/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/RiskDetectionsBlade/riskState~/[]/userId/", UserId, "/riskLevel/[]/daysBack/90")// Someone wrote "90s" incorrectly in Defender XDR portal
| join kind=leftouter (
SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName == "MCAS" and ProductName == "Microsoft Cloud App Security"// and AlertType == "MCAS_ALERT_ANUBIS_???"
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by VendorOriginalId
| project
AlertName,
AlertSeverity,
Description,
AlertStatus = Status,
Entities,
ExtendedProperties,
VendorName,
ProviderName,
ProductName,
ProductComponentName,
RemediationSteps,
Tactics,
Techniques,
SubTechniques,
VendorOriginalId,
SystemAlertId,
CompromisedEntity,
AlertLink
) on VendorOriginalId
| extend
AlertLink = coalesce(AlertLink, AltAlertLink),
ExtendedPropertiesDynamic = todynamic(ExtendedProperties)
| as _Events
| lookup kind=leftouter (
union SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
//| where RiskEventTypes_V2 has "mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules"
| where OriginalRequestId in (toscalar(_Events | summarize make_list(RequestId)))
| extend TimeReceived = _TimeReceived
| summarize arg_max(TimeReceived, *) by OriginalRequestId
| invoke UnifySignInLogs()
| project
TimeGenerated,
CreatedDateTime,
Type,
//UserDisplayName,
//UserPrincipalName,
//UserId,
AlternateSignInName,
SignInIdentifier,
UserType,
IPAddress,
AutonomousSystemNumber,
Location,
NetworkLocationDetails,
ResultType,
ResultSignature,
ResultDescription,
ClientAppUsed,
AppDisplayName,
ResourceDisplayName,
DeviceDetail,
UserAgent,
Status,
MfaDetail,
AuthenticationContextClassReferences,
AuthenticationDetails,
AuthenticationProcessingDetails,
AuthenticationProtocol,
AuthenticationRequirement,
AuthenticationRequirementPolicies,
SessionLifetimePolicies,
//TokenIssuerType,
IncomingTokenType,
TokenProtectionStatusDetails,
ConditionalAccessStatus,
ConditionalAccessPolicies,
SignInLogs_RiskDetail = RiskDetail,
RiskEventTypes,
RiskEventTypes_V2,
RiskLevelAggregated,
RiskLevelDuringSignIn,
SignInLogs_RiskState = RiskState,
HomeTenantId,
ResourceTenantId,
CrossTenantAccessType,
AppId,
ResourceIdentity,
UniqueTokenIdentifier,
SessionId,
OriginalRequestId//,
//CorrelationId
) on $left.RequestId == $right.OriginalRequestId
// | where case(
// // AlertStatus == "Resolved" and tostring(todynamic(ExtendedProperties)["State"]) == "Closed", false,
// SignInLogs_RiskState == "dismissed" and SignInLogs_RiskDetail == "aiConfirmedSigninSafe", false,
// SignInLogs_RiskState == "remediated" and SignInLogs_RiskDetail == "userPassedMFADrivenByRiskBasedPolicy", false,
// true
// )
| project
//TimeGenerated,
ActivityDateTime,
DetectedDateTime,
Source,
Activity,
DetectionTimingType,
UserDisplayName,
UserPrincipalName,
UserId,
IpAddress,
RequestId,
CorrelationId,
TokenIssuerType,
RiskEventType,
RiskDetail,
RiskLevel,
RiskState,
AdditionalInfo,
Id,
AlertName,
AlertSeverity,
Description,
AlertStatus,
Entities,
ExtendedProperties,
VendorName,
ProviderName,
ProductName,
ProductComponentName,
RemediationSteps,
Tactics,
Techniques,
SubTechniques,
VendorOriginalId,
SystemAlertId,
CompromisedEntity,
AlertLink,
TimeGenerated,
CreatedDateTime,
Type,
//UserDisplayName,
//UserPrincipalName,
//UserId,
AlternateSignInName,
SignInIdentifier,
UserType,
IPAddress,
AutonomousSystemNumber,
Location,
NetworkLocationDetails,
ResultType,
ResultSignature,
ResultDescription,
ClientAppUsed,
AppDisplayName,
ResourceDisplayName,
DeviceDetail,
UserAgent,
Status,
MfaDetail,
AuthenticationContextClassReferences,
AuthenticationDetails,
AuthenticationProcessingDetails,
AuthenticationProtocol,
AuthenticationRequirement,
AuthenticationRequirementPolicies,
SessionLifetimePolicies,
//TokenIssuerType,
IncomingTokenType,
TokenProtectionStatusDetails,
ConditionalAccessStatus,
ConditionalAccessPolicies,
SignInLogs_RiskDetail,
RiskEventTypes,
RiskEventTypes_V2,
RiskLevelAggregated,
RiskLevelDuringSignIn,
SignInLogs_RiskState,
HomeTenantId,
ResourceTenantId,
CrossTenantAccessType,
AppId,
ResourceIdentity,
UniqueTokenIdentifier,
SessionId//,
//OriginalRequestId,
//CorrelationIdExplanation
This KQL (Kusto Query Language) query is designed to detect and analyze suspicious inbox manipulation rules in Microsoft Cloud App Security (MCAS) and related sign-in activities. Here's a simplified breakdown of what the query does:
-
Set Parameters: It defines two parameters:
query_frequency(5 minutes) andquery_period(2 days). -
Filter Risk Events: It retrieves risk events from the
AADUserRiskEventstable that were generated in the last 2 days, specifically those from Microsoft Cloud App Security with the risk event type "mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules". -
Summarize Events: It summarizes these events to find the first occurrence time and the most recent details for each unique event ID.
-
Extract Additional Info: It processes additional information from these events to extract a unique identifier (
VendorOriginalId) from the alert URL. -
Project Relevant Fields: It selects specific fields to keep for further analysis, including user and risk details.
-
Generate Alternate Alert Link: It creates an alternative alert link for each event based on user ID and other parameters.
-
Join with Security Alerts: It performs a left outer join with the
SecurityAlerttable to enrich the data with additional alert details from MCAS, such as alert name, severity, and remediation steps. -
Extend and Format Data: It extends the data with additional properties and formats it for further analysis.
-
Lookup Sign-In Logs: It performs a lookup to join with sign-in logs (
SigninLogsandAADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs) to correlate risk events with sign-in activities, enriching the data with sign-in details. -
Project Final Fields: Finally, it projects a comprehensive set of fields from both the risk events and sign-in logs for analysis.
Overall, this query is designed to detect suspicious email rule manipulations, correlate them with sign-in activities, and provide detailed information for security analysis and response.
Details

Jose Sebastián Canós
Released: September 26, 2025
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